Villages Without People: A Preliminary Analysis of American Views of Melanesians during World War II as Seen through Popular Histories by Zelenietz, Marty
18 
Villages without People: A Preliminary Analysis of 
American Views of Melanesians during World War II 
as Seen through Popular Histories 
Marty Zelenietz 
When I visited my parents in April 1988, my father showed me the travel 
supplement of a local paper, thinking that I'd enjoy the feature article on 
Papua New Guinea. From the title alone, "Welcome to the Stone Age," I 
could imagine the contents, the usual stereotyped images of Papua New 
Guinea: jungles, headhunters, cannibals. The author fulfilled my expectations, 
conjuring up the image par excellence of Melanesia: "The natives are friendly, 
despite their well-deserved reputation as headhunters, a practice that is only a 
few generations in the past" (Handley 1988,1). 
Can we escape this image, this myth? I doubt it. Myths give particular 
meaning to events, "transforming complex affairs into simple but crystal-clear 
'realities' that explain and justify how things are now" (Horne 1986, 57). They 
guide our vision and ftx our perspective. Probably, two centuries hence, travel 
writers will still write of "friendly New Guinea natives, only a couple of hun-
dred years removed from headhunting and cannibalism." Myths and images, 
having frozen our vision, possess a self-perpetuating ability to live on long 
after reality changes. Ghosts of the past influence our perceptions of the 
present as the travel supplement stereotype of Papua New Guinea demon-
strates. 
In this paper I talk about myths, images of the past, shadows of a war that 
ended more than four decades ago. The ghosts of the World War II live on, as 
the National Geographic knows (Benchley 1988). Images of the war still 
command our attention: witness the number of new books about the war (eg, 
Toland 1982; Terke11984; Spector 1985; Dower 1986), and the reprinting of 
old books (Smith and Finch 1987 [originally 1948]; MacDonald 1978 [origi-
nally 1947]). This flood of printed pages reflects the continuing importance of 
the war in American thought, history, and mythology. 
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History and Images 
With rare exception the expanding literature replicates and perpetuates a 
stereotype of indigenous Melanesians that is as inaccurate as the stereotype 
of Americans that many Melanesians hold (see eg, Gegeo, chapter 3). The 
people of Melanesia found themselves caught in the crossfire of a foreign 
war, a war that generated for them images and myths of powerful, generous, 
and egalitarian ,Americans. With my colleague, Hisafumi Saito, I've described 
the images held by one group of people, the Kilenge of West New Britain 
(Zelenietz and Saito 1986). The Kilenge experienced the war firsthand; they 
provided labor to build an airstrip, first for the Australians and later for the 
Japanese; they hid from the bombs and shells as the First Marine Division 
invaded Cape Gloucester on 24 December 1943; and they seIVed as carriers 
for MacArthur's forces on Bougainville and New Guinea. From such experi-
ences the Kilenge fabricated indelible images of the combatants. To this day 
the images provide local stereotypes to guide Kilenge interactions with 
foreigners. 
In trying to put the Kilenge view into a broader context, to ground the 
Kilenge images and memories in the larger events of the Pacific, and to see 
how the combatants felt about the indigenous peoples of the region, I 
thumbed through several readily available popular histories of the war. What 
I did not find in them struck me as being far more revealing than what I did. 
What was missing? Two lacunae captured my attention. First, I discov-
ered, historians almost totally ignore the battle for Cape Gloucester. 
Although the War Department released a film in 1944 called Attack: The 
Battle for Cape Gloucester, that battle never captured the public's imagina-
tion, never spawned the images and press copy generated by battles like Gua-
dalcanal (eg, Tregaskis 1943; Kent 1972; Hoyt 1983) or Buna (Mayo 1974}.1 
At best, Gloucester rates a few paragraphs (Spector 1985, 247) or pages 
(Davis 1962,168-188; Berry 1982, 64-65,84-85,102-105) in books that deal 
mainly with other events and campaigns. 
The second thing I couldn't find was local people. The Americans were 
important to the Kilenge; the Kilenge, as far as I could see, did not exist for 
the Americans. The more I read about the Pacific War, the more it struck me: 
references to the indigenous peoples of Melanesia were few and far between. 
When mentioned at all, Melanesians usually fit a particular Western stereo-
typical image of "the native." Soldiers and historians recalled the mud, the 
malaria, the mountains, and the monsoons, but not the Melanesians. Writers 
make abundant reference to places and villages, but rarely to the inhabitants. 
In my search for Melanesians, I was chasing images of invisible people, 
shadows of nonentities. 
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The invisible Melanesian contrasts sharply with the .flesh-and-blood 
civilian in the European theater of the war (see eg, Mauldin 1945; Mac-
Donald 1978). Americans came out of the war with a clear image of a Europe 
brought to its knees by the war's devastation, a land teeming with dispos-
sessed, destitute refugees. Ultimately America responded to this image with 
the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. No such plan benefited the 
war-ravaged people of Melanesia. Why, I asked myself, should one group 
leave such a visible and memorable image, and the other group fade into 
oblivion like a photograph left in the sun? 
That question forms the basis of this presentation. Although I deal with 
matters of what we call history here, I am not a historian. Rather I am an 
anthropologist. As such, I'm accustomed to gathering my information by iiving 
with people, participating in their lives, talking with them, and learning from 
them. Their views, after all, reflect their culture. This is how I learned the 
meaning of World War II for the Kilenge. For this paper, however, I have had 
neither the resources nor the time to travel and interview survivors of the 
war, to explore the images they hold of the people of Melanesia. But these 
images are not inaccessible: literate people generate and record their myths in 
writing. Trade paperback books, written primarily by Americans for an 
American audience, became my informants. These books represent American 
myth-making, and because they sell successfully and continually in the popu-
lar market, I presume they reflect, at least in part, the American worldview. 
Undoubtedly there is something of a dialectical process at work here. These 
books not only mirror the values of the culture that spawns them, they also 
shape the images that culture holds. I want to show how they feed our stereo-
types of Melanesians. I make no claim to have examined the popular and 
scholarly literature thoroughly and exhaustively. My research, really in its 
infancy, has only scratched the surface of a wealth of written material. My aim 
is to examine how American fighting forces, and those who record their 
deeds, their mythmakers, saw or failed to see the indigenous people of 
Melanesia during World War II, to explore American images of the Mela-
nesians, and in contrasting those images with images held of Europeans, to 
account for why those images exist. . 
But before I talk of the people of Melanesia, I must first talk of the land 
itself, because before they saw the people, the Americans saw the land, and 
the land etched indelible images on the American psyche. American percep-
tions of, and experiences with, the Melanesian landscape profoundly 
influenced what and how they later saw the people. 
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Images of Melanesia 
American forces went into the Southwest Pacific not knowing what to expect, 
or for that matter where they were going. For the most part they never under-
stood the geography of that vast oceanic area. "To this day, few GIS and 
Marines have the remotest idea of where they fought" (Manchester 1980, 94). 
We may understand civilian and enlisted personnel's bewilderment over the 
North and South Pacific (Manchester 1980, 94; TerkeI1984, 527), but Mac-
Arthur's apparent confusion between New Guinea and Papua (1964, 164), 
and Spector's inappropriate description of Lae as a "village" and Buna a 
"town" (1985, 216) reveal the underlying and persistent depth of American 
ignorance of Melanesia. 
Unlike the Philippines, or Guam, or Hawai'i, Melanesia did not form part 
of the American colonial experience in the Pacific. Here was a world most· 
Americans had never before seen, never before experienced. A landscape 
totally alien, its awesome beauty overwhelmed their senses; its hidden dangers 
could cost them their lives. Their first long look at this land impregnated their 
senses with ambivalent and contradictory responses: 
O,lost tropic beauty of sea and cocopalm and sand. 
It is scarcely believable that I can remember it with pleasure, and 
affection, and a sense of beauty .... The pervasive mud, and jungle gloom 
and tropical sun, when they are not all around you smothering you, can have 
a haunting beauty at a far remove .... 
But, God help me, it was beautiful. I remember exactly the way it looked 
the day we came up on deck to go ashore: the delicious sparkling tropiC sea, 
the long beautiful beach, the minute palms of the copra plantation waving in 
the sea breeze, the dark green band of jungle, and the dun mass and power 
of the mountains rising behind it to rocky peaks .... The jungle stillnesses 
and slimes in the gloom inside the rain forest could make you catch your 
breath with awe. From the mountain slopes in mid-afternoon with the sun at 
your back you could look back down to the beach and off across the straits 
to Florida Island and one of the most beautiful views of tropiC scenery on 
the planet. None of it looked like the pestilential hellhole that it was. 
(Jones 1975,31-38) 
In 1976, as a neophyte fieldworker in IGlenge, I went on a tour of local 
"war sites" (mainly bomb craters and shell holes) with a friend. We scrambled 
up and down slippery slopes, following a track barely six inches wide. 
Hemmed in by dense green foliage, I couldn't see eighteen inches beyond my 
nose. As the sweat poured off me, my soaking shirt clinging to my back, I 
knew I couldn't get any wetter than this. I was wrong, as a cloudburst soon 
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taught me. Gasping for breath, wrapped in the bosom of the jungle, I thought 
"How the hell could anyone fight a war here?" 
It isn't the action that stands out the most to me about Cape Gloucester 
though, it is the awful weather. Rain, rain, rain, every day and night ... 2 
You'd be trying to move through the jungle when you'd find yourself up 
to your knees, or deeper, in a mudpit. There was a joke floating around that 
went like this: 
This captain is looking at one of those mud pies when a helmet appears 
moving through the mud. Then it comes up a little higher and. the captain 
sees a head. 
"Jeez," the captain says, "you must be in real deep." 
"Real deep," the Marine replies. "Wait 'till you see the bulldozer I'm 
driving'" 
Thenthere was jungle rot. You couldn't possibly keep your socks dry, 
much less your boondockers. This knocked the devil out of your feet. By the 
time we left New Britain many of our men could hardly walk. 
Another menace was those big trees. They were rotten. The shelling and 
the lightning were always knocking them over. Our division actually had 
several men killed from either lightning or falling trees. (Berry 1982, 64-65) 
Melanesia surprised the Americans; they were ill-prepared for the 
landscape, climate, and conditions. At Buna the camouflage dye in their 
uniforms reacted with the tropical heat and sweat, causing great discomfort 
and skin rashes, and the infantry never seemed to have the right weapons at 
the right time (Mayo 1974). Guadalcanal was a "vision of beauty, but of evil 
beauty" (Manchester 1980, 192), a "loathsome, lethal island where the 
malarial mosquito became as great a danger as the machine gun and the 
mortar" (Winton 1978, 71). In this first tropical battlefront, "[while] battle 
causalties [by September 1942] had not yet reached 1000, twice that number 
were suffering from malnutrition, the aftereffects of dysentery, virulent fungal 
infections, and exhaustion. Malaria, shortly to strike down so many, was just 
beginning to appear" (Griffith 1963, 159). And at Cape Gloucester, "the damn 
diseases ran rampant. Malaria came back, and so did dysentery--just think 
what happened to your bowels in weather like that. Even our ponchos began 
to disintegrate" (Berry 1982,54-55). 
Melanesia, for the Americans fighting there, was a world full of contra-
dictions. A fecund, verdant land teeming with lush growth and abundant life, 
it was also a shadowy world with the stench of ever present death and rot. 
What Mayo said for Buna applies to Melanesia as a whole: ''The battleground 
had been a vast, primitive, almost unknown wilderness of towering mountains 
and steaming coastal jungles, burned by the equatorial sun and drenched by 
191 
MARTY ZELENIE1Z 
tropical downpours" (1974, 171). As the land was alien, primitive, and 
unknown, so too were its people. 
Images of Melanesians 
What kind of people did the hundreds of thousands of American troops who 
served in Melanesia expect to find there? Understandably, but regrettably, 
few authors delve into the troops' expectations: men going into combat would 
hardly spend their last hours of peace philosophically discussing the nature of 
the inhabitants of their battleground. Most likely they hit the beaches in 
blissful ignorance, as unknowing about the people as about the land. 
Manchester wrote: "In the view of World War II GIS and Marines, most of 
what they had heard·about the South Seas w~ applesauce. They had 
expected an exotic world where hustlers like Sadie Thompson seduced 
missionaries ... and wild men pranced on Borneo ... and lovely native girls 
dived for pearls wearing fitted sarongs, like Dorothy Lamour" (1980, 101). 
At best, their expectations were parodies of reality. Tregaskis recorded 
this story: "In the hours before the first wave landed on Guadalcanal, Dr 
Malcolm V. Pratt, the senior medical officer aboard, who won distinction in 
the First World War, told me an amusing story this afternoon. 'I went below 
to look around last night,' he said 'expecting to find the kids praying, and 
instead I found 'em doing a native war dance. One of them had a towel for a 
loin cloth and a blacked face, and he was doing a cancan while another beat a 
tomtom'" (1943, 32). At worst, their ignorance was absolute. "Nobody had 
ever heard of it [Guadalcanal] ... the guys had a thousand queries for their 
officers. What was the target island like? Any bars? Any tail?" (Manchester 
1980,204). 
The few images of Islanders readily available to the Americans came 
mainly from two sources, both cut from the same cloth. Missionary tales and 
explorer exploits formed the raw material, the basic myth, for American 
preconceptions of Melanesians. Book titles such as Cannibal Land (Johnson 
1929), Cannibal Caravan (Miller 1939), The Heart of Black Papua (Taylor 
1926), John G. Paton, Hero of the South Seas (Byrum 1924), E"omanga, the 
Martyr Isle (Robertson 1902), The Savage Solomons . .. (Knibbs 1929), and 
The Isle of Vanishing Men (Alder 1922) indicate the readY'· made stereotype of 
Islanders as savage, headhunting cannibals that pervaded the thoughts of 
those in the know. Thus an American correspondent commented that he flew 
"over Malaita Island, home of cannibals and of a few hardy missionaries" (Lee 
1943, 350), and a popular historian records the tribulations of a downed flier 
who feared his would-be rescuers would put him in a cannibal pot (Lord 1977, 
192). Griffith, who fought on Guadalcanal as a Marine officer, found this use 
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for the quintessential stereotype: "Henderson-based aircraft had their own 
troubles. They were kept operable by maintenance crews who cannibalized a 
badly shot-up plane with the same loving care the Solomon Islanders had a 
century previously bestowed on dismembering a plump missionary" (1963, 
123-124). 
Many Melanesian societies did practice headhunting and cannibalism in 
the past, but most societies had abandoned those practices long before World 
War II. Read's (1986) recent reflective study of Susuroka shows us the pos-
sible speed, depth, and impact of cultural and social change: what people did 
a generation before may not relate in the slightest to their contemporary 
actions. We cannot impute behavior to a people based solely on what their 
ancestors did. But myths live on. 
Perhaps, from a historical and relativistic position, we can understand the 
use, during the war, of the cannibal image. Cannibals are, after all, everything 
that civilization is not, and the war was (among other things) a war for civili-
zation. What becomes hard to excuse is the historical perpetuation of the 
cannibal image, the almost pornographic and voyeuristic fascination with the 
savage. Do we really benefit from Mayo's passing description of the Oro-
kaiva? ''They were only fifty years removed from cannibalism, and that in a 
peculiarly revolting form--the practice of 'living meat', in which they tied their 
prisoners to a tree and as meat was needed cut slices from buttocks or legs, 
plaster pandanus leaves over the wounds ... " (1974, 15). But the prurient 
interest in cannibalism lingers: Horton (a former district officer and coast-
watcher in the Solomons) captions one of his photos "Former cannibals train 
hard to defend their island against the invading Japanese" (1971, 16) and 
notes that "exploits such as these [coastwatcher Kennedy's] soon stirred up 
the warlike spirit of the local people which was never far below the surface. 
They had been famed in the not so distant past as headhunters" (Kennedy 
1971, 39). Kent meanwhile reminds readers that the vicious fighting on Gua-
dalcanal "made the headhunting exploits of the old days seem tame by com-
parison" (1972, 9). Ultimately the savage image carries into the present and 
we encounter the inexcusable remark, "Stealthy cannibals still flourish in 
Papua" (Manchester 1980, 115). 
Within this context, what kinds of images and myths emerged from Amer-
ican wartime contact with Melanesians? How did the Americans see and 
describe the Islanders? 
Some accounts suggest that the Americans did not even see Melanesians 
as being distinct peoples, different from other Pacific Islanders. American 
servicemen appeared uninformed about or indifferent to distinctions between 
various Pacific peoples (cf Saito, chapter 19). Americans, by labeling various 
island people "gooks" (TerkeI1984, 60; Berry 1982, 36; Manchester 1980, 
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101) imposed a generic nativehood on the people of the Pacific.3 Cultural 
distinctions mattered little: natives were natives. 
Americans rarely saw Melanesians as whole human beings, people with 
houses, families, beliefs, and day-to-day concerns. Detailed American depic-
tions of Melanesians are few and far between. Fahey's firsthand account uses 
relatively neutral language in a bare-bones description of people and a village 
in the Solomons, and of Islanders on Efate and New Caledonia (1963,86, 23, 
32). Manchester comes close to depicting Melanesians as Rousseauean 
"noble savages," innocents ofthe jungle (1980,101-102). Tregaskis supplies a 
lengthy passage about Savo Islanders, their appearance, their villages and 
churches (1943, 191-194). He describes his scouting party's guide as "typical 
native pattern: stumpy, dirty teeth, red hair, childish manners" (192). Later 
writers, if they even describe the "natives" at all, evoke similar images of short, 
childlike people. Melanesians were "wiry little men" (Hoyt 1980, 113), "small, 
black natives ... afflicted with malaria, dengue fever and fungus infections," 
"stocky, muscular black men with six-inch shocks of dirty red hair" (Davis 
1962, 109, 129) who could barely count past ten (Hoyt 1983, 105). Some 
authors use more neutral terms, such as "local inhabitants" (Hess 1974,88) or 
"tribesmen" (Cortesi 1985, 45). For the most part, though, information on the 
island people and their way of life is sadly lacking, with only a few writers 
providing even minimal historical and anthropological background (see 
Horton 1971,8-11; Kent 1972, 9-10; Manchester 1980, 110-111). 
American writers, if they acknowledge the Melanesians at all, tend to see 
them primarily in terms of how they helped or hindered the war effort. 
MacArthur cited "friendly co-operation from the New Guinea natives" as an 
important contributing factor in his Southwest Pacific campaign (1964, 165). 
From the first day Americans landed on Guadalcanal and recruited Melane-
sian guides, Melanesians made substantial contributions to the Allied cause 
(Manchester 1980, 206). They served as carriers and bearers on the Kokoda 
trail (Mayo 1974), in New Britain (Davis 1962, 129, 180), and in many other 
combat areas. As part of the Australian coastwatching service, they were 
scouts and guerrillas, gathering vital intelligence, harassing and misleading the 
Japanese (see eg, Lord 1977; Horton 1971; Kent 1972; Tregaskis 1943). They 
guided American patrols into enemy controlled territory and safely extricated 
them (eg, Griffith 1963; Hoyt 1980, 73, 98; Horton 1971,47,51). Villagers 
flocked to join the coastwatchers and aid the war effort (Lord 1977, 245; 
Horton 1971, 39). Manchester even reports that tribesmen in Papua walked 
200 miles to Port Moresby to aid that town's Australian defenders (1980, 
103). Whether as part of the organized coastwatching service or simply as 
villagers, they rescued dozens of downed American airmen (eg, Hoyt 1983, 
125; Horton 1971,52; Hess 1974,56,88). Even in the New Guinea Highlands, 
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far removed from battlefield action, Melanesians "did their bit" for Allied 
success: Cortesi relates Chimbu contributions in locating a site for, and then 
constructing, an advanced aircraft base at Tsili Tsili (1985). 
The saga of Sergeant Major Jacob Vouza epitomizes American respect 
for Melanesian aid and loyalty during the war. Vouza, who was tortured, 
stabbed, and left for dead by the Japanese as punishment for carrying an 
American flag, dragged himself back to American lines on Guadalcanal and 
insisted on giving his report before being hospitalized. His courage, bravery, 
and devotion earned him an undying place in American war lore (see Berry 
1982, 132-133; Griffith 1963, 107-111; Horton 1971, 19; Hoyt 1983,96; Kent 
1972,61; Lord 1977,69-73; Manchester 1980, 221ff; Tregaskis 1943, 149-50). 
Vouza, for the Americans, symbolizes the best of their stalwart Melanesian 
allies, sorely mistreated by the Japanese. The exploits ofVouza and his island 
compatriots, their indomitable will and loyalty in the face of Japanese oppres-
sion, earned high praise. Those exploits also served as a moral tale, a legend 
demonstrating the "rightness" of the American way (Horne 1986, 59). The 
emergent image and myth shows people who were "loyal soldiers for the 
allies" (Hoyt 1980, 113). ''The natives avoided them [the Japanese) as they 
would men stricken with the plague"; "[t]he natives, all of them, were loyal to 
the Allied cause" (Griffith 1963,41, 127). "There was no love lost between the 
natives of the Solomons and the Japanese" (Berry 1982, 119). "The Allied 
forces could count on the complete co-operation of the Solomon Islanders 
whereas the Japanese were detested" (Horton 1971, 17).4 
Despite these testimonials to their fortitude, and despite the obvious role 
they played in the war, Melanesians are often overlooked by those comment-
ing on the war. Spector slights both the war's impact on Islanders and their 
participation in the hostilities. Although he examines the effect of American 
servicemen on states and colonies of the Pacific rim, he chooses to concen-
trate on Australia and India, dismissing Melanesia in a single sentence: "In 
remote parts of New Guinea and the New Hebrides, they [GIs] inspired 
bizarre "cargo cults" among the local inhabitants, some of which have 
continued to the present day" (1985, 400). He mentions a number of cam-
paigns, such as Kokoda-Buna (189), the fighting on Guadalcanal (192), and 
the construction of the Tsili Tsili air base (240), all without acknowledging 
the presence let alone contribution of the Melanesians involved (in contrast, 
see Mayo 1974 for Buna; Griffith 1963 for Guadalcanal; and Cortesi 1985 for 
Tsili Tsili). Spector is not unique: a pattern emerges from the literature, a 
pattern of vi IJ ages without people, natives without substance. Americans 
portray unidimensional Melanesians--allies in war, but nothing else. If the 
Islanders were not actively assisting the Americans, they were not "there." 
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Two oral histories of American recollections of the war are nearly devoid 
of mention of Pacific Islanders. Berry's book (1982) on the Marines contains 
infrequent references to indigenous peoples, while Melanesians are totally 
absent from Terkel (1984). Winton's book (1978) has one photograph of an 
Islander as its sc::sle Melanesian content. Numerous other accounts of the war 
cite many village names, but usually fail to mention the inhabitants of those 
places (eg, Mayo 1984; Hoyt 1980; Hoyt 1983; Griffith 1963; Lee 1943; Jones 
1975). Melanesian villages were targets, objectives, or landmarks but not 
places where people lived. Accounts of the air war also ignore Islanders. 
Morrison's book (1986) contains one mention of Melanesians, and Hess 
(1974), in his history of Pacific aerial combat, only twice mentions them, both 
times in connection with rescuing downed airmen. Apart from that, Melane-
sians seem absent. Where were they? 
Many, no doubt, fled the contlict and hid in the bush. In the Solomons 
district officers ordered the villagers to leave the coast and make their homes 
and gardens in the mountainous island interiors (Horton 1971, 34; Kent 1972, 
29). Mayo describes Papuans fleeing as the Japanese came ashore at Buna 
(1974,16), and Lord takes us into a village deserted after American shelling 
(1977,139). In Europe too people fled at the first sign of battle, but returned 
shortly after (MacDonald 1978). The Kilenge I studied remembered going 
back down to the coast to meet the Americans after the shooting stopped, 
and the legendary Marine, "Chesty" Puller, returned "1700 natives" to their 
villages on New Britain (Davis 1962, 182). Somehow, though, the return of 
Melanesians never made the impression on Americans that the return of 
Europeans did: it did not leave an image, it did not contribute to a myth. 
Careful reading of the various accounts shows that, in truth, the Melane-
sians were there, on the spot, seeing and being seen by Americans. We 
already know from Manchester that Islanders met the Americans the first day 
the latter were on Guadalcanal. Tregaskis' firsthand account of Guadalcanal 
is notable for its lack of reference to Melanesians, excluding his description of 
Savo Islanders .. Why, then, does he relate the incident of a patrol that found 
the raped and mutilated body of a young girl by the side of a trail (1943, 172), 
and then pass on without further remarks? Were Melanesian women that 
common a sight that only a hacked torso called for comment'!s Again, if 
Melanesians weren't there, why does Tregaskis, on his way back to civiliza-
tion, rejoice at seeing "dusky maidens swimming in the surf," a welcome relief 
"after looking at marines, Japs and betel-chewing Melanesian men" (1943, 
262), unless, of course, he'd seen (but never mentioned) his fill of Melanesian 
men on Guadalcanal? 
Were American servicemen barred from contacting Melanesians'! Non-
fraternization rules were certainly in place (eg, Fahey 1963, 57, 86), but the 
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Kilenge fondly remember many American visitors to their villages, and the 
nonfratemization rules did not pose any barrier to soldier-civilian interaction 
in Europe (eg, MacDonald 1978, 347). 
From the air it seems Melanesians were as invisible as they were at 
ground level. Thus Cortesi (1985), who praises Chimbu contributions to the 
TsiIi TsiIi air base, never even suggests that Melanesians could have been the 
victims of American bombing attacks at Wewak. Jablonski (1971) too never 
mentions the possibility of Melanesian casualties of the air war. This starkly 
contrasts with his frequent mention of European civilian casualties of 
American and British bombing attacks.6 
Perhaps we don't hear.more of Melanesians because the Islanders inter-
acted more with garrison and service troops than with actual combat troops. 
As soon as the combat units secured their objectives, garrison units and ser-
vice outfits relieved and replaced them. The overwhelming trend in popular 
histories of the war favors either command personalities or combat units and 
conflict situations. Life in garrison or service units paled in comparison, and 
similarly would probably make for dull reading. Books on noncombatant 
units, in other words, wouldn't sell; hence, they aren't published. The same 
situation holds true, of course, for Europe. Yet civilians on that continent 
figure prominently in the war literature. 
American servicemen viscerally understood the differences between the 
European theater of operations and the Pacific theater. "In the Pacific, there 
were none of the European diversions. What you tended to see were miser-
able natives and piles of dead Japanese and dead Americans" (TerkeI1984, 
64). "Our jungle rot waS the equivalent of their trench foot. But we didn't 
have much in the way of female civilian population, or wine cellars" (Jones 
1975,121). Americans "liberated" European towns and cities (eg, Mauldin 
1945; MacDonald 1978; TerkeI1984), but only once did I encounter the term 
"liberated" used in connection with Melanesian communities (Davis 1962, 
182). 
For the 01, the Pacific had "natives," while Europe had "civilians." The 
images of Melanesians that Americans carried into the islands, and the images 
they subsequently formed there, differ sharply from their images of Europe 
and Europeans. The wild, savage land and its wild, savage people stood a 
world apart from the cathedrals and civilians of Europe. The 01 could barely 
understand or comprehend the land and people of Melanesia: they were a 
foreign, alien enigma. But the 01 could empathize with the plight of the Euro-
peans caught in a war-tom continent. With very little difficulty American 
soldiers could see themselves mirrored in the wretched, miserable, displaced 
continental civilians. 
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It would take a pretty tough guy not to feel his heart go out to a shivering, 
little six-year-old squeaker who stands barefoot in the mud, holding a big tin 
bucket so the dogface can empty his mess kit into it .... 
It chills a man to see a young girl. with a haunted hopeless expression in 
her eyes and a squalling baby which must go on squalling because she is 
hungry and has no milk for it. Not only does he pity her, but he thinks that 
this could possibly have happened to his own sister or his wife. 
(Mauldin 1945.66.69; see also MacDonald 1978,220-221) 
The GI ability to empathize with Europeans, to insert himself into the role 
of the civilian other, and the inability to similarly empathize with or absorb 
the role of Melanesian villager. is not terribly hard to comprehend. In part the 
explanation lie-s in the American orientation toward Europe. an orientation 
based in bonds of blood and culture. "Virtually all Americans were descended 
from European immigrants. They had studied Continental geography in 
school. When commentators told them that the Nazi spearheads were knifing 
here and there. they needed no maps: they all had maps in their minds" (Man-
chester 1980. 49). Their cognitive maps of the world, in which the "Old 
Country" loomed large, told many Americans as they crossed the Atlantic that 
they were headed "home." "I was in Fulda [Germany]. where my namesake, 
Saint Winfrid, converted the tree-worshipping Germans to Christianity. My 
family came from this area" (TerkeI1984, 158). The roots of American cul-
tural values stretched across the ocean to Europe. Americans identified 
strongly with their Old World origins, but felt no such affinity toward Melane-
sians, whose land, cultures, and customs were totally alien. 
Understanding the American ties to Europe. and the lack of similar 
feelings toward Melanesia, helps us to explain the different images of those 
parts of the world conveyed in and by the war literature. This understanding, 
however. provides us with only a partial explanation of the differences. Ifwe 
look into mainstream American society itself, into then-prevalent American 
beliefs and attitudes, we can more fully account for why Americans saw Euro-
peans one way, and Melanesians another way. I contend that Americans 
failed to identify with Melanesians, failed to see them as whole human beings, 
because Melanesians have black skin. The issue is a matter of race. 
Images of Black and White 
Racial discrimination, racial segregation. and white supremacist attitudes 
were all well-entrenched in society in general, and the military in particular. as 
America entered World War II. A nation supposedly united to win the war 
systematically excluded black citizens from participating in a labor force 
crying out for workers: only one black worked at the General Motors plant in 
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La Grange, Illinois, and only nine blacks worked for Lockheed in Los 
Angeles, all as sweepers. Eventually, under threat of a march on Washington 
led by A Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, the Roosevelt government issued Executive Order 8802, authorizing 
the Fair Employment Practices Commission (Terkel 1984, 9, 33-38). 
The military, a microcosm of American life, reflected general social 
feelings. Racist attitudes dictated that blacks could only make mediocre 
soldiers (Spector 1985, 386), that "blacks were not to be trusted in combat" 
(TerkeI1984, 9; see also MacDonald 1978, 200, 333, 337). Thus on the eve of 
, the war only four thousand blacks served in the US military, less than in 1900 
(Spector 1985, 386). Rac~t belief so pervaded society that, even in the face of 
a growing need for troops and a nondiscrimination clause in the Selective 
Service Act, local draft boards chose married whites and white fathers over 
eligible single blacks (Spector 1985, 387). 
Once in the military, blacks confronted a system little changed from the 
prewar Jim Crow days. For all intents and purposes they lived in a world 
separate from their white brothers-in-arms. "I think of two armies, one black, 
one white. I saw German prisoners free to move around the camp, unlike 
black soldiers, who were restricted" (Terkel 1984, 149). Black servicemen 
rode in separate railway cars and were excluded from white PXS and service-
men's clubs without having their own comparable facilities (Terkel 1984, 
150). They formed separate units, mainly labor battalions "with dressed-up 
names like engineer, quartermaster, what have you" (TerkeI1984, 365), and 
their camps were strictly segregated on military bases, out of sight to most 
base visitors and personnel (TerkelI984, 263; Williams 1983). The Red Cross 
even segregated blood from black and white donors (TerkeI1984, 566). 
Segregation ran so deep that one black air unit, the 332nd Fighter Group, 
isolated on their air base, had to take off in the wrong direction down the 
runway. When blacks did form combat units their training was often so 
prolonged and so intense that they ended up being elite units (Terkel 1984, 
344). Williams' fascinating book, Hit Hard (1983), documents the trials and 
tribulations faced by one black tank outfit. The 761st Tank Battalion faced 
racism and discrimination at home, abroad, and after the war; it took them 
thirty-five years to get a Presidential Unit Citation (Terkel 1984,231; 
Williams 1983). 
Just as blacks fought to join the civilian war effort, so too did they fight 
the discrimination and racism in the military. A race riot broke out at Camp 
Shenango, Pennsylvania, over separate but unequal facilities. Only after the 
deaths of soldiers did the situation improve (TerkeI1984, 150). Similar riots 
were barely avoided at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana (Williams 1983,80-83) 
and Camp Lucky Strike, France (Terkel 1984, 369), but naval personnel did 
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riot in Guam (Spector 1985,391-393). Naval stevedores at Port Chicago, 
California, mutinied after two hundred black ammunition loaders died·in an 
explosion (TerkeI1984, 392-401). In most of these incidents inquiries white-
washed the military, concluding that the blacks were too sensitive. They 
. consistently failed to recognize the racism inherent in the structure of the 
services (Spector 1985, 393). 
Blacks recognized the irony of their situation. They were fighting a "race 
war" (Dower 1986, 4) against America's enemies, while America stilI system-
aticalIy exploited and discriminated against its own black citizens. "The 
struggle against both the Germans and the Japanese was accompanied by 
attacks on master-race theories in general, arid thus cut at the roots of white 
supremacism and discriminatory laws and institutions in the United States" 
(Dower 1986, 175). Dower, in his provocative book, argues that the Pacific 
War was, for both sides, a race war. He maintains that Americans judged their 
German and Japanese enemies by different standards. While authorities 
incarcerated Japanese Americans, they were Jar less systematic in incar-
cerating German and Italian Americans. The "bad guys" in Europe were not 
the German people as a whole, but ratherjust the Nazis. The entire Japanese 
nation, in contrast, served as the vilIain in the Pacific. The press played up the 
difference between the war against Germany ("a family fight ... between 
white nations"), and the war against Japan (a war of Occidental and Oriental 
ideals and civilizations) (Dower 1986,165). 
America bad long feared the "yelIow horde" across the Pacific Ocean, and 
American colonial policy in the Pacific contained more than a tinge of racism 
(see eg, Lee 1943, 24; Dower 1986, 148ft). Colonized peoples, like domestic 
Blacks, lived under the burden of such labels as primitive, monkey, savage, and 
wild, terms meant to dehumanize them (Dower 1986, 149). Propagandists 
revived these terms for the war against Japan. The rhetoric of the Pacific War 
"calIed for 'the almost total elimination of the Japanese as a race', on the 
grounds that this 'was a question of which race was to survive, and white 
civilization was at stake' " (Dower 1986, 55). The American propaganda 
machine depicted the Japanese as either superhuman or subhuman, but not 
as human. 
Here lies the final clue to understanding American attitudes toward 
Melanesians. Domestic racism not only pervaded American society and the 
US military establishment; a virulent, xenophobic, and patriotic racism domi-
nated the Pacific battlegrounds. Many Americans saw themselves fighting a 
race war, a "war without mercy," against a savage, primitive foe. They fought 
their first land engagements in the islands of Melanesia, a land already 
stereotyped in myth as wild, savage, alien. Fighting and horrendous conditions 
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of heat, mud, rain, and insects, as well as a merciless foe, reinforced the image 
of Melanesia as a savage land. 
In this latter-day version of hell, the Americans encountered people with 
alien and savage customs, strange cultures, and black skins. Not all, perhaps 
not even most, Americans held strongly racist views: many individual Ameri-
cans came to know and respect Melanesians as whole people. But insofar as 
the American mythmakers, those who recorded the war and generated our 
images of the war, saw those Melanesian people at all, they identified the 
indigenous inhabitants with the land, saw them through the lens of racial 
prejudice, and connected them with the death and destruction of a racial war. 
Rightly or wrongly, Americans associated the Melanesians with the Japanese 
enemy. Although the two differed from one another, both were foreign 
people: strange, alien, primitive, and savage. American commentators did not 
see Melanesians as whole people, as human beings. At best, Melanesians 
became curious, primitive, and cannibalistic allies. At worst, being not quite 
human and not the enemy, Melanesians were not even there. Innocent vic-
tims of a foreign war, Melanesians became caught in the trap of historical 
oblivion. 
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Notes 
1 As a rule of thumb, the early ground battles in Melanesia drew more attention than the 
later battles. Progress in the Central Pacific, North Africa, and Europe tended to overshadow 
the Southwest Pacific campaign. 
2 The First Marine Division invaded Cape Gloucester during the height of the monsoon 
season. "Sixteen inches of rain fell in a single day" (Manchester 1980, 98). 
3 This phenomenon is similar to that of European settlers creating the category of "Indian" 
when they lumped together the various indigenous peoples of North and South America. 
201 
MARTY ZELENIETZ 
4 Reality in Melanesia, of course, differed from the.preceding hyperbolic rhetoric, which 
serves as myth-reinforcing legend. Local people in the Buna-Gona region turned over Australian 
and American civilians and soldiers to the Japanese (Mayo 1974,25-26). Some Solomon 
Islanders displayed active hostility to Australians hiding from the Japanese, "betraying" their 
former colonial masters, and the Japanese made some headway in winning Islander loyalty 
(Lord 1977, eg, 223-224). 
5 Perhaps they were, perhaps they weren't. By the time Manchester arrived at Guadal-
canal, he could record the parenthetical comment: "(The only native woman I saw on 
Guadalcanal had a figure like a seabag. She was suffering from an advanced case of elephan-
tiasis. Hubba Hubba.)" (1980,22). 
6 There are just two references to Melanesians in his entire volume on the Pacific air war, 
while the first fifty pages of the companion volume on the European air war contain no less than 
six references to civilians and civilian casualties. 
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